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COMMENT 
CRITIQUE OF THE VEIL OF FAIR REPRESENTATIONl 
By: Professor Michael Hayes 
Mr. Brando Simeo Starkey ("Mr. Starkey") disapproves of age-
related restrictions on eligibility to play professional sports.2 
"Disapproves" actually understates his position. At various points, 
Mr. Starkey calls such restrictions "unjust" and "irrational."3 Until 
two years ago, Mr. Starkey would have been well-justified in calling 
such age-related restrictions most likely illegal. 
In what has become known as the "Spencer Haywood case4," the 
player of that name challenged then-existing bylaws of the National 
Basketball Association ("NBA") that barred anyone from playing in 
the NBA until four years after he, or his high school class, graduated 
from high schooP A federal trial judge, and then Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas, held that Mr. Haywood was entitled to a 
"preliminary injunction," permitting him to play for an NBA team, 
because he raised a significant question whether the NBA's four years 
after high school rule violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.6 Mr. 
Haywood ultimately won on the merits, as a federal district court held 
that the NBA's age-related restrictions constituted an illegal "group 
boycott" forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 The decision 
opened the door not only to Mr. Haywood, but to scores of basketball 
players who joined NBA teams after fewer than four years of college 
play,S and even to players who came to the NBA immediately from 
high schooP 
l. Branda Simeo Starkey. The Veil of Ignorance: Maurice Clarett v. NFL, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 
(forthcoming Fall 2006). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Haywood v. Nat'! Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
Id. at 1204-05. 
See id. at 1204-07. 
See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. lO49, lO66-67 (C.D. Cal. 
1971). 
Some Hall of Famers like Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson had fewer than four years 
of college play. 
Stars like Kevin Garnett, Kobe Bryant and LeBron James came to the NBA immediately 
after high school and less stellar players like Kwame Brown, Taj McDavid and Leon 
Smith did the same. See Mark Alesia, Age-Old Question; for NBA Draft Picks, How 
Young Is too Young?, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 23,2004, at Dl. 
36 
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The National Football League ("NFL") also has an age-related 
restriction on player eligibility -- that no person may play in the NFL 
until three football seasons have elapsed after he or his "high school 
class" has graduated from high school. lO Mr. Starkey's article refers to 
this restriction as "The Rule."11 As Mr. Starkey explains, the legal 
validity of The Rule came into question when it was challenged by 
former Ohio State running back, Maurice Clarett. 12 There, a federal 
district court judge held that The Rule violated antitrust laws and was 
not covered by exemptions to those laws. 13 As of February 2004, 
when the district court rendered the Clarett decision, it seemed that the 
NBA, the NFL, and presumably every other professional sports league 
could not legally maintain age-related restrictions on player eligibility. 
Since then, the tide has turned. Later in 2004, as Mr. Starkey 
discusses, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court decision in the Clarett case, and upheld The 
Rule as lawful. 14 The Second Circuit reasoned that The Rule did not 
violate antitrust laws because it was protected by the "nonstatutory 
exemption" to antitrust law. 15 Under that exemption, market 
restrictions, like The Rule, are immune from antitrust challenge when 
they stem from a collective bargaining relationship between an 
employer or group of employers and the union that represents the 
employees of the employer( s) .16 
Since the Second Circuit's decision, both the NFL and NBA have 
included age-related eligibility restrictions in the collective bargaining 
agreements they have negotiated with the unions representing their 
players. The new collective bargaining agreement negotiated between 
the NBA and the NBA Players' Association in the Summer of 2005 
included a section providing that, to be eligible to play in the NBA, a 
player must attain nineteen years of age in the calendar year in which 
the draft is held, and that at least one NBA season has elapsed since 
the player, or his high school class, graduated from high school. 17 In 
lO. See Clarett v. Nat"! Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
11. Starkey, supra note 1 (forthcoming publication). 
12. See Clarett, supra note lO at 382. 
13. See id. at 390-97 (finding exemptions inapplicable); id. at 404-11 (finding The Rule 
violates antitrust law given no exceptions apply). 
14. See Clarett v. Nat"! Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
15. Id. at 138-42. 
16. Id. at 134-35. 
17. See National Basketball Players Association, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. 
X: Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles/ 
article-X.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). 
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March 2006, in negotiations to revise and extend (for six years) the 
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the NFL 
Players' Association the parties formally incorporated The Rule into 
their agreement. IS In all likelihood, the NFL and the NBA were 
inspired by the Second Circuit's Clarett decision to negotiate their 
eligibility restrictions into their contracts with their players' unions to 
make certain those restrictions were covered by the labor exemption 
and therefore safe from challenge under the antitrust laws. 19 
Mr. Starkey strongly criticizes the current state of the law, where 
the labor exemption makes legally valid the professional sports 
leagues' restrictions on player eligibility. Mr. Starkey, however, does 
not aim his attack at the labor exemption, at least not directly. This is 
probably wise, given that there are already dozens of law journal 
articles discussing whether the Second Circuit was correct in Clarett in 
ruling that the labor exemption applied to the NFL's eligibility rule.20 
Mr. Starkey instead contends that the labor laws, if properly 
interpreted and applied, should forbid an age-related eligibility 
restriction from ever emerging from a collective bargaining 
relationship between an employer and a union. 
The key legal principle that Mr. Starkey employs to support his 
argument is a union's legal "duty of fair representation" to the 
employees it represents. Mr. Starkey correctly describes the legal 
standards on fair representation, noting the duty is breached only 
18. See Mark Maske, New Deal Limits Disciplinary Action, WASH. POST, Mar. lO, 2006, at 
E3. 
19. See id. (stating union negotiator for the NFL players union describes inclusion of 
eligibility rule in contract as "formally clos[ing] the Maurice Clarett loophole'"); see 
Kevin J. Cimino, Note, The Rebirth of the NBA - Well, Almost: An Analysis of the 
Maurice Clarett Decision and Its Impact on the National Basketball Association, 108 W. 
VA. L. REv. 831, 833 (2006) (arguing convincingly that the Clarett case was the reason 
that the NBA negotiated eligibility restrictions into the collective bargaining contract 
with the players union). 
20. In a LEXIS search on September 30, 2006, the author found more than thirty law review 
articles discussing the Second Circuit's decision in the Clarett case. E.g. Jason Abeln, 
Chris Brown & Neil Desai, Comment and Casenote, Lingering Questions After Clarett v. 
NFL: A Hypothetical Consideration of Antitrust and Sports, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1767 
(2005); Peter Altman, Note, Stay Out for Three Years After High School or Play in 
Canada - and for Good Reason: An Antitrust Look at Clarett v. National Football 
League, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 569 (2004)Walter Champion, Clarett v. NFL and the 
Reincarnation of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 47 S. TEX. L. 
REv. 587 (2006); Jeffrey Hoffmeyer, Fourth Down and an Appeal: The Nonstatutory 
Exemption to Antitrust Law in Clarett v. National Football League, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 
193 (2006); Michael Scheinkman, Comment, Running Out of Bounds: Over-Extending 
the Labor Antitrust Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REv. 733 (2005). 
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when a union's conduct toward a represented employee is "arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or in bad faith" and that unions are accorded a "wide 
range of reasonableness" in their representative functions, especially 
when negotiating agreements. Even though these standards are very 
deferential to unions, Mr. Starkey asserts that age limits are so unfair 
that a union violates its fair representation duty by "agreeing" to them. 
Assuming for the moment that a union's agreement to an age limit 
is a breach of its duty of fair representation, that finding would not 
deliver the result Mr. Starkey wants - removal of such age limits in 
professional sports. The NFL and NBA could, and in the past have, 
established age-related eligibility restrictions without getting their 
players' unions to agree to them. Both the NFL and NBA had such 
restrictions in their policies before they ever bargained about them 
with their players' unions. 21 If one of these employers proposed to the 
union that the employer be able to retain its eligibility restrictions, or 
even expand them, then the employer could add those restrictions as 
terms of employment, even if the unions never agreed to them, as long 
as the employer bargained to "impasse" with the union over those 
restrictions. 22 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that the labor exemption to antitrust applies to a term that an employer 
unilaterally implements after impasse, even if the union never agreed 
to it. 23 Given these legal rules, even if Mr. Starkey were absolutely 
correct that a union's duty of fair representation precludes it from ever 
agreeing to an age limit on player eligibility, the NFL, the NBA, and 
any other professional sports employers could still establish such 
limits. 
At one point, Mr. Starkey seems to acknowledge that a union does 
not really control whether age limits will be put in place. Mr. Starkey 
states that the duty of fair representation requires that the NFL players' 
union should "at least have to challenge" an NFL proposal to impose 
age limits, and argues that any union that "fails to fight" against age 
limits is violating its duty. Significantly, Mr. Starkey fails to identify 
21. See Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality of 
Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional 
Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 550-51 (1998) (discussing the history of 
the NBA's eligibility rule). Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126 (discussing the origins of the NFL's 
eligibility rule). 
22. See Stephen D. Buchholz, Comment, Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers' 
Ability to Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment after Impasse in Brown v. Pro 
Football, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1207 & n.34 (1997) (explaining the legal rules on 
implementing terms after bargaining to impasse). 
23. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 243-48 (1996). 
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the means by which unions are obligated to "challenge" and "fight" 
such limits. Given an employer's power to establish and change 
employment terms over a union's most strenuous objection, the only 
way to stop terms from going into effect is for the workers to refuse to 
work under them, i.e. to go on strike. Is Mr. Starkey insisting that 
professional sports unions are violating their legal duties unless they 
go on strike and cancel games and maybe even seasons, to stop age 
limits? Almost all unions' by-laws require them to submit a decision 
to strike to their members for a vote.24 It's highly probable that the 
hundreds of NFL players already on NFL teams, if asked by their 
union to give up their income and even risk being replaced in order to 
stop the NFL from setting an age limit on joining those teams, would 
overwhelmingly reject going on strike for that purpose. Does Mr. 
Starkey believe that a union would breach its duty of fair 
representation by abiding by such a majority vote? 
Although these are fair questions in the face of Mr. Starkey's 
sweeping pronouncements on fair representation, the hypotheticals are 
extreme in comparison with what the NFL and NBA players' unions 
actually did with regard to age limits in the past year. Both unions in 
fact agreed to include age limits in their agreements in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.25 Is a union's agreement to an age limit a breach of its 
duty of fair representation? To support his argument that it is, Mr. 
Starkey relies on the concepts of "Rules of Justice" and "Veil of 
Ignorance" set forth by the late philosopher John Rawls' in his classic 
book, A Theory of lustice26 • Applying those principles, Mr. Starkey 
contends that no person (or organization) would establish or agree to 
an age limit for eligibility to playa professional sport. 
As an admirer of Professor Rawls and his book, I am always 
interested in applications of his ideas to different situations. Mr. 
Starkey's proposal to apply Rawlsian principles to collective 
bargaining is fascinatingly provocative, and dramatic in its 
implications. Unfortunately, it is also inappropriate. It simply makes 
no sense to apply Rawlsian principles to bargaining between 
employers and unions. Professor Rawls himself maintained that the 
responsibility for setting the rules for allocation of resources rested 
24. See David Westfall & Gregor Thiising. Strikes and Lockouts in Germany and Under 
Federal Legislation in the United States: A Comparative Analysis. 22 B.C.lNT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 29, 60 (1999). 
25. See supra note lO, 1l. 
26. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1971). 
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exclusively with political institutions, i.e. govemments.27 As Mr. 
Starkey rightly points out, Rawls' question is, "To ask what rules 
would people behind the veil of ignorance adopt."28 However, in 
collective bargaining, unions do not play the role of "adopting" rules. 
If they did, the unions probably would say, "Yes, everyone age 
eighteen or older should be eligible to play." They also would say 
"yes" to questions about whether every player should have generous 
health, retirement, and disability plans, and generous compensation in 
general, and limits on the employer's power to "cut" or otherwise 
terminate him. But a union cannot itself make any of those things 
happen. It has to persuade or pressure the employer to provide them. 
And in collective bargaining, an employer does not go through each 
item and say to the union, "Do you want A, do you want B, do you 
want C?" In effect, the employer asks the union, "Which of these 
items do you want the most, and what items are you willing to give up 
or trade to get those most desired items?"29 
At one point, Mr. Starkey sets forth his view of how a union should 
go about determining appropriate age standards. However, that is not 
the way in which the issue is posed to the union in bargaining. 
Instead, age restrictions are just one of dozens of issues, all arrayed 
before the union at the same time. Any union knows that whenever it 
pushes for a particular result on one issue (e.g. eliminating age 
restrictions), it is reducing the likelihood of obtaining its desired result 
on another issue. 3D Even if one were to put the "veil of ignorance" 
over the union, so it is unaware of considerations that Rawls would 
deem impermissible (such as which types of players have the most 
political power in the union), it would not necessarily follow that 
abolishing age restrictions would deserve the highest priority among 
all the bargaining demands the union could make. It would not even 
necessarily comply with another Rawlsian principle that Mr. Starkey 
mentions-- that rules should be arranged to most benefit those who are 
27. See Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 529, 
536 (2001). 
28. John Kilcullen, Rawls: The Original Position, 1996, available at 
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockhamly64Ll3.html (last visited Oct. 16,2006). 
29. See generally, National Football League Players Association Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, available at http://www.nflpa.org/CBNCBA_Complete.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 14,2006). 
30. See Douglas H. Blair & David L. Crawford, Labor Union Objectives and Collective 
Bargaining, 99 Q. J. ECON. 547 (1984). See Eileen Silverstein, Union Decisions on 
Collective Bargaining Goals: A Proposal for Interest Group Participation, 77 MICH. L. 
REv. 1485 (1979). Both articles discuss how unions, in bargaining, must prioritize 
among issues. 
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the least advantaged. Are players who must defer beginning their NFL 
careers for one to three years really the "least advantaged" persons 
affected by the union's bargaining? Are they less advantaged than 
players, of whom there are always dozens in the NFL, who are at risk 
of having their NFL careers ended forever after only a year or two of 
play? Are the "deferred" players less advantaged than injured players, 
or long-term disabled players, who are among the categories of players 
that the union represents? These would be difficult and important 
questions even if the union had the power to set all the terms for NFL 
players. When adding in the complication that the union does not 
have that power, and can only try to obtain from the employer the best 
terms it can for all the employees it represents, then it becomes clear 
how unreasonable it is to conclude that a union violates its duty of fair 
representation if it agrees to an age-related eligibility restriction. 
Although I disagree with the means Mr. Starkey proposes for 
removing age limits, I agree with him that they should be abolished. I 
also agree that Rawls' Theory of Justice3l supports his conclusion. 
Taking the issue out of the realm of collective bargaining (as I think it 
should be), the question becomes what kinds of rules we would adopt 
as members of society, if we were forced to stand behind the veil of 
ignorance. With regard to rules on eligibility to perform a vocation, I 
think a very good Rawlsian case could be made for concluding we 
would never, on account of a person's age, adopt a rule barring a 
person from performing a vocation when he or she is perfectly 
competent at performing that vocation. There are many signs in Mr. 
Starkey's article that it is really this type of universal, per se 
prohibition on age-related eligibility restrictions that he believes 
should be the law. 
As explained above, labor law is not the appropriate source for such 
a prohibition on age limits. The real issue seems to be discrimination, 
and there are laws against age discrimination. 32 Unfortunately, federal 
law prohibits discrimination only against older workers, specifically 
those aged forty or older.33 However, the laws of the State of 
Maryland provide a possible path to the objective that Mr. Starkey 
seeks. Maryland's law against age discrimination does not specify a 
3l. Rawls, supra note 26. 
32. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN et. al. EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.38 (3d ed. 2004). 
33. See 29 U.S.c. § 63l(a) (2000) (limiting the coverage of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to "individuals who are at least forty years of age'"). 
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minimum age requirement,34 and Maryland's law makes it illegal for 
an employer to "fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of 
such individual's ... age."35 The age-related eligibility restrictions of 
the NFL (and NBA) seem vulnerable to a challenge under this 
Maryland law against age discrimination. Perhaps someday, a talented 
young football player who wants to join the Baltimore Ravens will sue 
to strike down The Rule as discriminatory, and thus take a major step 
towards abolishing age-related eligibility restrictions from professional 
sports. 
34. See State of Maryland Commission on Human Relations, What You Should Know About 
Age Discrimination, at 1, available at http://www.mchr.state.md.uslbrochures/ 
AgeDiscweb.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,2006). 
35. MD. CODE ANN., Discrimination in Employment § 16(a)(1) (West 2006). 
